

# Will Technology Make Health Economists Obsolete?

or

## *Why Old Dogs Might Want to Learn Some New Tricks*

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### A Glaring Contradiction

- In one way or another, most of us work—either directly or indirectly—for what is arguably the most technologically advanced industrial enterprise humankind has ever known—the biopharmaceutical industry
- We easily can forget dizzying pace of technological change in biopharma:
  - When I began my career, notable advances in drug development included sustained-release formulations of oral meds (holes drilled by lasers in pills[!]) and transdermal delivery systems
  - And today I am working for companies designing treatments to change our DNA and cure genetic diseases
- Yet technology we use to produce models to assess value of medical interventions has been stagnant for long time

## How We Produced Health Economics Models 20 Years Ago



## How We Produce Health Economics Models Today



## Our Production Technology Has Remained Unchanged for Many Years

- Most health-economics models today are developed in Excel on bespoke basis, same way they were 20 years ago:
  - Unless we all agree to begin working 12-hour days, big gains in production efficiency—bringing lower costs and reduced turnaround times—are unlikely to occur
- Ironic that technologically advanced industry like biopharma is so dependent for its survival and success on artisans and guild methods of production:
  - Do we believe there are no C-suite discussions about this problem?
  - We may be inclined to ignore this problem, as biopharma's costs are mother's milk of our profession

## Our Production Technology Has Remained Unchanged for 20 Years (Cont.)

- We should see this situation as unsustainable:
  - “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop” (“Stein’s Law”)
    - Herbert Stein, former Chairman of US Council of Economic Advisers
- Moreover, from perspective of those who depend on information we produce, problems with our production technology are not limited to high cost and long production times for our work products

## Our Production Technology Also Creates Huge Need for Quality Control

- ❑ Bespoke model development also means that every new model must be carefully checked for errors, from ground up
- ❑ We are fooling ourselves if we think that we can ensure that calculations in our spreadsheet models are correct:
  - These models easily can contain tens or hundreds of thousands of worksheet cells (or more), making process of error-checking tedious and time-consuming at best—and in many instances, impossible
  - And even if we wanted to thoroughly check our work for errors, our brains are pre-wired to ignore them

## Our Ability to Spot Errors



## Our Ability to Spot Errors (Cont.)



## Our Brains Are Pre-Wired to Ignore Errors

- *According to a research at Cambridge University, it doesn't matter in what order letters in a word are, the only important thing is that the first and last letters be in the right place. The rest can be a total mess and you can still read it without problem. This is because the human mind does not read every letter by itself, but words as a whole.*

## Problem of Errors in Our Models

- We probably do a poor job of catching errors in models we build in Excel
- While these models can be validated by building second one from scratch, this is rarely done due to budget and time constraints:
  - *“Do it right first time instead of charging me twice!”*
  - And if second model yields different answer than first, then what?
- In reality, we do not know how extensive problem of undetected errors is in our work:
  - To better understand this, we can learn from other fields
  - Let’s consider field of *cetology*, or study of whales

## Errors in Models: Whale’s Tales

- My interest is not with these kinds of whales . . .





## Errors in Models: Whale's Tales (Cont.)

- ... but rather in these kind



## What Cetaceans Can Teach Us: Tale of a London Whale

- This particular cetacean's name is Bruno Iksil:
  - A talented modeler who worked for JP Morgan in London
  - He developed new "value-at-risk" (VaR) model in Excel to help bank manage its credit derivatives portfolio
- Every night, JP Morgan (along with other banks) placed "bets" in credit derivatives market:
  - Bets would be placed with borrowed money
  - Borrowing allows banks to place much larger bets than they could if they were limited to using their own funds
  - Leverage means that banks can make—and lose—a lot of money on these bets

## What Cetaceans Can Teach Us: Tale of a London Whale (Cont.)

- Banks use VaR models to make sure they don't wager more than they could afford to lose:
- Bruno's new model, like those of his peers, was developed in Excel:
  - His model was reviewed by JP Morgan's in-house Model Review Group, comprised of many talented and experienced modelers
  - Model Review Group gave "thumbs-up" to Bruno's new model
- And then one day in 2012, JP Morgan announced that it had lost ~\$6B overnight, based on bets Bruno had placed in credit derivatives market:
  - Everyone thought that he had committed a crime
  - He was dubbed the "London Whale"

## What Cetaceans Can Teach Us: Tale of a London Whale (Cont.)

- Intensive investigation was conducted, by law enforcement authorities and various bank officials, including JP Morgan's Model Review Group
- These investigations revealed that bank's massive loss occurred because it had placed much larger bets in credit derivatives market than it should have:
  - And reason this happened? A *single error* in Bruno's model!
  - Report of JP Morgan's Model Review Group:
    - *"After subtracting old rate from new rate, spreadsheet divided by their sum instead of their average, as (Bruno) had intended; this error muted estimated volatility and lowered VaR"*
    - Bruno's model had series of linked worksheets, in which he often would manually copy/paste data from one worksheet to another



## What Cetaceans Can Teach Us: Tale of a London Whale (Cont.)

- Thought should be sobering that JP Morgan was betting billions of dollars on predictions of an Excel model that was checked much more carefully than most of *our* models:
  - Everyone missed fact that *single (simple) equation* was wrong
  - Mistake was easy to see if you knew what you were looking for—but easy to overlook if you did not know that a mistake existed, and where it could be found
- Perhaps I am cherry-picking, and this example is isolated:
  - Can find other examples where simple—but important—errors in Excel models go unnoticed?
  - We don't need to look very far to find more cetaceans

## What Cetaceans Can Teach Us: Tale of Two Harvard Whales

- In 2010, two Harvard economists, Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, circulated their now-famous paper entitled, “Growth in a Time of Debt”:
  - Its authors argued that they had identified critical “threshold” for government debt (0.9 x GDP), which would cause economic growth to fall sharply if exceeded
  - They argued for fiscal austerity to limit government spending and borrowing, and stop level of debt from rising
  - Reinhart & Rogoff achieved near-sainthood among self-proclaimed political guardians of fiscal responsibility
  - Their “tipping point” was treated not as a hypothesis, but as an undisputed fact

## What Cetaceans Can Teach Us: Tale of Two Harvard Whales (Cont.)

- There was one problem, however:
  - No one had been able to replicate their findings
  - Finally, in April 2013, mystery of their irreproducible results was solved
- BBC reported that an undergraduate student doing a homework assignment had discovered errors in Reinhart and Rogoff's calculations:
  - The professors, it seems, accidentally left 5 countries out of a key calculation when copying and pasting a formula in Excel
  - Inclusion of data for these 5 countries, which professors had meant to do, changed their findings
  - In fact, there was no magic "tipping point" when debt rose to 90% of GDP

## What Cetaceans Can Teach Us: Tale of a French Whale Too

- In 2013, a French economist, Thomas Piketty, published a best-selling book, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*:
  - Piketty argued that when rate of return on capital is greater than rate of economic growth, result is concentration of wealth, which leads to widespread social and economic instability
  - He proposed global system of progressive taxes on wealth to help reduce inequality and avoid this dire outcome
- There was one problem, however

## What Cetaceans Can Teach Us: And a French Whale Too (Cont.)

- In 2014, *Financial Times* reported that it had launched major critique of analyses underpinning Thomas Piketty's bestseller
- There were errors, newspaper reported, in Piketty's spreadsheets:
  - Unfortunately, *Financial Times* reported, Piketty had bad habit of hard-coding adjustments into his worksheet formulas, resulting in errors in analyses that underpinned his conclusions

## Excel Can Cause Us To Conflate Looking and Seeing

- While Excel has reputation of being highly transparent, we often mistaking looking for seeing:
  - In above examples, errors in worksheets were in plain sight, but nonetheless went undetected
- Error in Bruno's model was discovered only because one of world's largest banks almost blew up
- Errors in Reinhard & Rogoff's and Piketty's models were discovered only because thousands of people reviewed their published work:
  - Their models were reviewed much more closely than most—if not all—of our models

## Will Technology Make Us Obsolete? A Little Crystal-Ball Gazing

- Technology that many of us use to build models (ie, Excel) is old, inefficient, costly, and time-consuming:
  - It also is prone to errors, which can be difficult to find
- As marketplace accords greater importance to value of new medical interventions, information we produce is becoming increasingly important to decision makers:
  - Aside from increasing length of our workday, it is largely impossible to increase our productivity with existing technology
- New technologies are emerging that can automate many tasks on which we routinely spend hours (eg, hēRo3):
  - It would be naïve to assume that those who are dependent on information we produce will not embrace new technologies

## Will Technology Make Us Obsolete? A Little Crystal-Ball Gazing (Cont.)

- New technologies cannot replace all bespoke modeling—but they can replace a lot of it
- New technologies will drive down turnaround times and costs needed for model development, which in turn will increase demand for health-economics models across product lifecycles
- Technological change will not make health economists obsolete—but it will be disruptive, providing opportunities for some, while posing threat to others