

Panel Session 1 Background: QALYs and Thresholds

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Outline

- What is a threshold?
- What is a QALY?
- How does it relate to WTP?
 Must relate to preferences
- How does it relate to Opportunity cost of health care?
 Must relate to health benefit derived
- How are either related to thresholds?

Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER)



- Higher *ICERs* indicate lower costeffectiveness
- But what does this *ICER* tell the decision makers?
- A new intervention is found to be more effective and more expensive but.....
- It is necessary to have further information to determine whether society considers this additional benefit to be worth the additional cost involved

- To do this, an external value system is needed - something to compare the *ICER* to:
 - 'Cut-off point', 'ceiling value', threshold (λ) for the *ICER*
 - λ represents the maximum amount society is willing to pay for a unit increase in health benefits (maximum price (WTP) or shadow price of a unit increase in the health benefits)

$$ICER = \frac{Cost_{int} - Cost_{comp}}{Eff_{int} - Eff_{comp}} < \lambda$$

QALYs & WTP (Broome, 1993)

- Fairly well known that QALYs find it difficult to meet the axioms of expected utility
- Broome (1993) picks up on a number of issues
 - $V(q_1, q_2, \dots, q_y) = v(q_1) + r_2 v(q_2) + \dots + r_y v(q_y).$
 - Where v are value functions measuring good/benefit of each q
 Separability can hold if individual risk-neutral
- Then we get the EU function

Discounting implies separability

- $E(u(V(q_1, q_2, \dots, q_r))) = E(u(v(q_1) + r_2v(q_2) + \dots + r_rv(q_r)))$
- Note that the EUs [u(.)...] are attached to the v(.)s and it is the v(.)s that are additively separable
 - And therefore linearly transformable and therefore cardinal measures
 - It is NOT the "q"s (the quality of life measures) that are cardinal measures
- He reconciles by introducing goodness or benefit measures of "q"

$$D(q_1, q_2, \dots, q_y) = g(q_1) + \rho_1 g(q_1) + \dots + \rho_y g(q_y).$$

ρ=discount rate

QALYs & WTP (Broome, 1993)

- So the g(.) & v(.) functions are related through some transformation
- The QALY [v(.)] is some transform of the good/benefit [g(.)] function
- QALYs assign values to these "states of health" but are determined by how people feel in these states of health, their preferences or by some objective principle
- We simply do not know how QALYs relate to preferences
- Moreover in adjudicating *across* individuals we need additional weights
- Difficult to come by if we do not know the v(.) to g(.) transform
- Basically QALYs cannot easily be related to WTP and require additional information to represent "societal" values
- Could relate to value of a statistical life but really?

The Cost Effectiveness (WTP) Threshold and how NICE works it out







QALYs and opportunity cost

- QALYs can be taken as value to individual of state of health as it relates to health benefit
- Easier jump to make that any "valuation" can be made on a revealed preference basis
- Value of the opportunity cost of resources currently devoted to producing a health state
- Assumes "rationality" in decision making

QALYs and opportunity cost

- In England approach to take QALYs =f(health expenditure)
- Martin et al (2008), Klaxton (2013)
- Essentially QALYs related to 23 programme budget areas within the NHS
- Econometrically derived
- Say essentially
- $H_{ii} = \alpha + \beta x_{ii} + \phi n_{ii} + \varepsilon_{ii}$ (with a related expenditure equation)
- H=QALY; x=expenditure; n=population health needs
- Still being worked on
 - Data (needs, QALY conversions, assigning "overheads", etc etc)
 - Endogeneity issues
 - IV estimates
 - Essential equations based on mortality changes converted into LYG, then QALYs
- But first systematic attempt to produce opportunity cost based QALY thresholds
- Lots of estimates based on various assumptions

QALYs and opportunity cost

Figure C.6 Distribution of the cost per QALY threshold (all 23 PBCs)



Source: Claxton et al, 2013

- Estimated for 23 programme budget areas
 - Give different values
 - Inefficient or Inconsistent?
 - Or diseases weighted differently?
- Could pick any number of estimates
- Let's take the median after a number of adjustments to be £10,378 per QALY
- Tested for model & parameter uncertainty
- Relatively stable
 - Well below current threshold
 - Correct?

Conclusions

- QALY difficult to define formally as a preference
- Therefore difficult to define as WTP
- Could be under a number of assumptions
- QALY must have an opportunity cost
- Difficulties in measuring this
- In both case societal weights required

Conclusion



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